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Abstract
Background: Priority setting for artemisinin-based antimalarial drugs has become an integral part of malaria
treatment policy change in malaria-endemic countries. Although these drugs are more efficacious, they are also
more costly than the failing drugs. When Tanzania changed its National Malaria Treatment Policy in 2006, priority
setting was an inevitable challenge. Artemether-lumefantrine was prioritised as the first-line drug for the
management of uncomplicated malaria to be available at a subsidized price at public and faith-based healthcare
facilities.
Methods: This paper describes the priority-setting process, which involved the selection of a new first-line
antimalarial drug in the implementation of artemisinin-based combination therapy policy. These descriptions were
further evaluated against the four conditions of the accountability for reasonableness framework. According to this
framework, fair decisions must satisfy a set of publicity, relevance, appeals, and revision and enforcement
conditions.
In-depth interviews were held with key informants using pretested interview guides, supplemented with a review
of the treatment guideline. Purposeful sampling was used in order to explore the perceptions of people with
different backgrounds and perspectives. The analysis followed an editing organising style.
Results: Publicity: The selection decision of artemether-lumefantrine but not the rationale behind it was publicised
through radio, television, and newspaper channels in the national language, Swahili. Relevance: The decision was
grounded on evidences of clinical efficacy, safety, affordability, and formulation profile. Stakeholders were not
adequately involved. There was neither an appeals mechanism to challenge the decision nor enforcement
mechanisms to guarantee fairness of the decision outcomes.
Conclusions: The priority-setting decision to use artemether-lumefantrine as the first-line antimalarial drug failed to
satisfy the four conditions of the accountability for reasonableness framework. In our understanding, this is the first
study to evaluate priority-setting decisions for new drugs in Tanzania against the accountability for reasonableness
framework. In addition to the demand for enhanced stakeholder involvement, publicity, and transparency, the
study also calls for the institution of formal appeals, revision, and regulatory mechanisms in the future change of
malaria treatment policies.
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Background
Malaria case management with pharmaceuticals is a
major challenge in many malaria-endemic countries.
Old but cheap and effective medicines are increasingly
facing resistance. By 2009, nearly all Plasmodium falci-
parum malaria-endemic countries, most being in sub-
Saharan Africa, had changed their treatment policies to
artemisinin-based combination therapies [1,2]. On the
other hand, rapidly increasing pharmaceutical expendi-
ture poses another major obstacle and has led to an
increased need for prioritisation in pharmaceuticals
worldwide [3,4]. When Tanzania changed its National
Malaria Treatment Policy in 2006, three choices of arte-
misinin-based combination therapies recommended by
the World Health Organisation (WHO) were available
[5]. The guiding principle was to guarantee access to
antimalarial drugs that are safe, affordable, effective,
acceptable, and of good quality for patients infected
with malaria [6]. Limited resources, especially for pub-
licly funded healthcare systems, mean that priorities
must be set, since not all the available interventions can
be provided for all who need them [7]. Among the avail-
able alternatives, artemether-lumefantrine (ALu) was
prioritised to be the first-line drug for the management
of uncomplicated malaria to be available at a subsidized
price in both public and faith-based healthcare facilities.
Tanzania has a fairly well-distributed healthcare sys-
tem, within which 66% of all the healthcare facilities
are owned by the government [8]. About 80% of the
population has access to healthcare services that, to a
large extent, do not meet the minimum acceptable
standards [9]. In 1993, the government introduced a
cost-sharing policy and health insurance schemes to
complement government financing and as an attempt
to improve the quality of services [10]. Currently,
about 15% of the population is covered by health
insurance [11]. Households contribute 47% of health-
care financing through out-of-pocket expenditure and
43% is financed by the government and donor support
[12].
Rational malaria treatment policy formulation presents
challenges to many endemic countries. At times, donors
may favour an approach that conflicts with the national
preferences [13,14]. Studies on the previous policy
change in Tanzania, from chloroquine to sulphadoxine-
pyrimethamine, described the process as irrational. It
was characterised by disagreements among the stake-
holders, mistrust of evidence, and accusations of influ-
ence from pharmaceutical companies [15,16]. The
change of policy was influenced by only a few indivi-
duals who were involved in various ways with malaria
[16].
Accountability for reasonableness and its applications in
Tanzania
The accountability for reasonableness framework (AFR)
(Table 1) is a procedural framework that was developed
as an approach to guarantee fairness and legitimacy of
priority-setting decisions in health [17-19]. When prop-
erly implemented, AFR can prevent the development of
fairness and legitimacy problems grounded on mistrust
of the processes. The framework outlines a roadmap of
four key conditions that must be fully fulfilled in the
decision-making process. In recent years, despite its lim-
ited application in developing countries, AFR has been
gaining popularity in Tanzania, especially at the district
level [20-22].
District and regional health planners have applauded
the framework for its ability to enhance participation,
transparency, and the development of relevant criteria
for decision making [20]. Where it has been used to
evaluate priority-setting decisions, it facilitated the iden-
tification of key areas that needed improvement [21,22].
Daniels and Sabin, who developed the framework, sug-
gest that ‘accountability for reasonableness’ is relevant
to pharmaceutical priority setting:
Managing access to pharmaceuticals is a microcosm of
the limit-setting problems of healthcare systems as a
whole. If we are right that accountability for reasonable-
ness is a solution to the legitimacy problem in health
Table 1 Accountability for reasonableness framework
Condition Description
Publicity Decisions regarding both direct and indirect limits to care and their rationales must be publicly accessible. The process of priority
setting must be open and transparent and consultations and public hearings should be held. Publicity and involvement of key
stakeholders are particularly important in contexts where policy and programmatic decisions occur in a multi-actor environment
and affect large parts of the population.
Relevance The rationales for priority-setting decisions should aim to provide a reasonable explanation of how organisations and health
providers seek to meet the health needs of a population under reasonable resource constraints. Specifically, a rationale will be
reasonable if it appeals to evidence, reasons, and principles that are accepted as relevant by fair-minded people who are
disposed to finding mutually justifiable terms of cooperation. By ‘fair-minded’ people, we do not simply mean our friends or
people who just happen to agree with us.
Appeals and
revision
There must be mechanisms for challenge and dispute resolutions regarding priority-setting decisions, and, more broadly,
opportunities for revision and improvement of policies in the light of new evidence or arguments.
Enforcement There must either be a voluntary or public regulation of the process to ensure the first three conditions are met.
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systems as a whole, then it should be possible to illus-
trate what such accountability would mean in practical
terms... –[17].
This is the first study to apply the AFR framework to
evaluate priority-setting decisions that involve selection
of drugs in Tanzania. The selection process for drugs to
be listed on the national essential medicine list also
involves priority setting. We argue that evaluation of
these decisions against the AFR framework is one
method of improving the process of drug selection. This
study therefore reports on the evaluation of the priority-
setting decision for the implementation of artemisinin-
based combination therapy policy against the four con-
ditions of the AFR framework.
Methods
Study type and participants
This was a qualitative study in which in-depth inter-
views were held with key informants. At least two parti-
cipants were selected from the following list of
institutions: Muhimbili National Hospital (MNH),
National Malaria Control Programme (NMCP), WHO
office in Tanzania, Ministry of Health (MoH), Tanzania
Food & Drug Authority (TFDA), Medical Stores Depart-
ment (MSD), and Muhimbili University of Health and
Allied Sciences (MUHAS). Participants were experts on
malaria research, administration of public health institu-
tions, management of patients, and regulation and man-
agement of pharmaceuticals.
Sampling and sample size estimation
The purposive sampling method was used to select the
key informants from the acknowledgements list of the
treatment guideline. A sample of 15 participants was
selected based on Guest et al.’s recommendations, which
imply that, in a piece of research that is narrow in scope
and has a homogenous sample, data saturation is
achieved after 12 interviews when thematic analysis is
employed [23].
Data collection
Data were collected by in-depth interviews held with key
informants using pretested interview guides and reviews
of the treatment guideline between May and July 2010.
A digital audio recorder was used to record the conver-
sations. The in-depth interview guide consisted of ques-
tions corresponding to the AFR framework [17]. Each
interview lasted for about one hour. The four conditions
of the framework were the main themes. The accessibil-
ity of the decision and its rationales were categorised
under publicity. Rationales and stakeholder involvement
were categorised under relevance. Efficacy, affordability,
availability, and cost effectiveness were subcategorised
under rationales. Representation, existence of explicit
procedures for stakeholder involvement in the task force
committee, and consultations were subcategorised under
stakeholder involvement.
Data management and analysis
Interviews were transcribed and then analysed using the
ATLAS.ti (ATLAS.ti Scientific Software Development
GmBH, Berlin, Germany), a qualitative data analysis
(QDA) software, using an editing organising-style
method [24]. First the template was prepared based on
the interview guide, according to Kvåle’s analysis
approach [25]. This approach involves the defining of
codes before an in-depth analysis of the data. Meaning-
ful units or segments of text in the transcripts and the
treatment guideline that correspond to the template or
related to this study were identified. Networks for each
code with their corresponding quotations were formu-
lated using the QDA program. These networks enabled
the researchers to analyse the descriptions of each parti-
cipant for each code for the transcribed data. Thereafter,
memos were written to combine these descriptions with
those that emerged from similar codes in the treatment
guideline. A network of all codes and their correspond-
ing memos under their subcategories was made, and
this enabled the researchers to analyse the descriptions
in the memos and reach a conclusion for each subcate-
gory. Finally, a network of the main themes of fairness
with their descriptions was made for final analysis and
evaluation, in order to determine whether or not the
four conditions were satisfied.
Data validity
To ensure the validity of the data, participants were
assured of the aim of the study and their names were
anonymised. The in-depth interviews were held in
places where interviewees felt comfortable, and the con-
versations were recorded by using a digital audio recor-
der. Interviews were transcribed by the interviewer
shortly after each session. Telephone numbers of the
interviewees were taken so that if any information was
missing, they could be called for clarification. Tran-
scripts were read and re-read several times so that the
researcher could become familiarised with their contents
before analysis. Coding of both the transcripts and the
treatment guideline were done separately, and the emer-
ging descriptions were triangulated during memo
writing.
Ethical issues
Ethical clearance (Ref. No. MU/PGS/SAEC/Vol. III/185)
was provided by the MUHAS Ethical Review Commit-
tee. Participants were asked for verbal informed consent
and for permission to be recorded prior to the
interviews.
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Results
Publicity condition
Accessibility of the decision and its rationales
A majority of the participants reported that the decision
about the selection and use of ALu was disseminated to
the public by the use of radio, television, and newspaper
channels in the national language, Swahili. Meetings
with other stakeholders, such as pharmacists, were also
held as a means of disseminating this information. They
also reported that all the public healthcare facilities
from the dispensary to the regional hospital level
received the treatment guidelines, which contained the
decision and rationales for the prioritisation of ALu.
Publicity condition: evaluation
The decision about the selection of ALu, but not the
reasons behind it, was communicated through advocacy
campaigns by National Malaria Control Program
(NMCP) and Ministry of Health (MoH) using different
media channels in Swahili, the national language. The
rationales were written in the treatment guidelines,
which are not easily accessible to the public, patients, or
other stakeholders who were not directly involved with
the task force [26].
Relevance condition
Rationales
Efficacy Participants reported that the problem of parasite
resistance to sulphadoxine-pyrimethamine was the major
factor that caused the change of the National Malaria
Treatment Policy. At the time of this policy change, three
choices of artemisinin-based combination drugs recom-
mended by WHO for management of uncomplicated
malaria were available. These drugs included sulphadox-
ine/pyrimethamine-artesunate (SP-AS), amodiaqine-arte-
sunate (AQ-AS), and ALu. ALu had the following
advantages over the other drugs: (1) it was the only fixed
combination drug among the three, (2) neither of its com-
ponents had documented reports of parasite resistance, (3)
it was safer, as amodiaquine’s safety profile had already
generated concern among healthcare providers and the
general public and (4) it was the most efficacious drug.
Affordability
Participants reported that affordability was not discussed
because of the agreement between the government and
the Global Fund to provide the drug at a subsidized
price at the public and faith-based healthcare facilities.
This was facilitated by the agreement between WHO
and the company that manufactures ALu, which made
the drug available at cost price for use in the public sec-
tor for malaria-endemic developing countries. However,
some participants raised concerns about the sustainabil-
ity of this financing approach.
... as a country you cannot just sit and wait for some-
body to carry the burden of maintaining your popula-
tion’s health, imagine if Global Fund does not keep on
sustaining this program!–Representative from MSD
Availability of subsidized artemether-lumefantrine
Participants pointed out that, based on Global Fund
requirements, the subsidized ALu could only be made
available at public and faith-based primary to tertiary
healthcare facilities. One participant who works at a ter-
tiary hospital expressed concerns about the low avail-
ability of ALu in the primary healthcare facilities:
I receive patients from the dispensaries who have been
given sulphadoxine-pyrimethamine and amodiaquine
and they sometimes ask why they are still prescribing
these drugs when the first-line drug is artemether-lume-
fantrine!–Physician from MNH
One participant was concerned about the urban-poor
populations who have to make a choice between long
waiting times and unreliable public health services ver-
sus reliable but unaffordable services in the private sec-
tor. Participants from National Malaria Control Program
(NMCP) said that other strategies were being considered
to make sure ALu was also available at a subsidized
price in the private-for-profit healthcare facilities.
Effectiveness and cost-effectiveness Participants said
that fixed-combination antimalarial drugs have better
compliance, hence are more effective compared to non-
fixed combinations. However, artemether-lumefantrine’s
six-dose regimen of four tablets to be taken twice a day
with a fatty meal for three successive days was a major
concern.
There are obvious improvements, admissions due to
severe malaria nowadays are few and this could be
explained by the effectiveness of artemether-lumefan-
trine. As a tertiary hospital we used to have a lot of
patients coming in coma due to cerebral malaria; this is
not research data but my own observation.–Physician
from MNH
About its cost-effectiveness, the majority of partici-
pants reported that there were no research data at the
time of the policy change that indicated the cost -effec-
tiveness of ALu.
Stakeholder involvement
Representation and existence of explicit procedures
for stakeholder involvement The task force committee
was composed of 25 members; 21 were medical doctors
and four were pharmacists. The medical doctors were
paediatricians, obstetricians/gynaecologists, parasitolo-
gists, and pharmacologists from Muhimbili National
Hospital (MNH) and Muhimbili University of Health
and Allied Sciences (MUHAS). Others were working
with the WHO country office, National Malaria Control
Program (NMCP) and Integrated Management of
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Childhood Illnesses (IMCI) programs within Ministry of
Health (MoH). The pharmacists were working with
Medical Store Department (MSD) in the procurement
and distribution of drugs, Tanzania Food and Drug
Authority (TFDA) in food and drug regulations, and the
pharmaceutical services unit at the Ministry of Health.
All the committee members were from institutions
based in the city of Dar es Salaam. Participants from
NMCP who coordinated the policy-change process
reported that they did not have written documents on
procedures to select the committee members but that
they ‘knew’ the main stakeholders. This approach was
criticised by one of the participants:
Sometimes I feel as if it is not adequate because if I
had not contacted those people with my findings, I
might not have been invited. So there might be other
people who are in the field but because they had not
made contact with Ministry of Health officials, they did
not get the opportunity to be part of the task force
committee.–Researcher from MUHAS
Participants reported that patients and the public were
indirectly involved through representation and consulta-
tions. It was also argued that the task force committee
members were potential malaria patients, and therefore,
they were themselves representatives of patients and the
public. The idea of direct patient and general public
involvement in the committee was opposed by some
participants who labelled it as inappropriate because
policy making is an expert’s field.
Consultations Participants reported that many consul-
tations were held before and even after the assembly of
the task force committee to get input and technical
advice about policy change. Participants from National
Malaria Control Program (NMCP) said that the first
draft of the guideline was reviewed by experts from
the National Institute for Medical Research, Malaria
Consortium-Kampala, WHO Afro, Médecins sans
Frontières, Ifakara Health Institute, and Eduardo Mon-
dlane-Maputo (Mozambique). They also reported that
the draft guidelines were shared by all district and
regional medical officers as well as partner countries
for technical advice. Councils gave input during the




The reasons for the prioritisation of ALu appeal to sta-
keholders because they were based on scientific evidence
of clinical efficacy, safety, and formulation profiles.
Financing mechanisms were already in place to ensure
that the drug would be available and affordable at the
public and faith-based healthcare facilities.
Stakeholder involvement
The study found that there were no transparent proce-
dures to engage the stakeholders. Some stakeholders
were involved because of their positions in the relevant
institutions, while others were involved through infor-
mal links with officials in the Ministry of Health
(MoH) or National Malaria Control Program (NMCP).
The committee lacked professional, institutional, and
countrywide representation. It was largely made up of
medical doctors and a few pharmacists; neither nurses
nor medical lab personnel were included. All the phy-
sicians, specialists, and academicians within the task
force committee came from one hospital, i.e. Muhim-
bili National Hospital (MNH) and one university,
Muhimbili University of Health and Allied Sciences
(MUHAS). There were other similar institutions in the
country that could have provided members to increase
representation.
Appeals and revision condition
Participants said that it is not easy for anybody to appeal
against the policy; however, if established facts and evi-
dence on toxicities and level of resistance were to be
provided, the policy decision could be revised.
I think the best way for people to appeal is to provide
scientific data in the scientific forum; it is impossible for
an individual to come up and say this is not the right
drug. From the community side, I think the only
mechanism they have is to express their concerns in the
newspapers and other media; otherwise, I don’t see any
other channels at the moment.–Participant from TFDA
Pharmacovigilance forms, which are used as post-mar-
keting surveillance tools in monitoring drug safety, were
mentioned as effective tools to generate evidence on the
safety profile of ALu. However, one participant dis-
agreed with the reliability of this approach.
Most of our clinics are crowded, before you can take a
minute or two to fill in the pharmacovigilance form, 20
people are already shouting at you, so it is one avenue
but is not satisfactory.–Physician from MNH
Appeals and revision condition: evaluation
There is no mechanism in place to appeal against the
decision to prioritiseALu.
Enforcement condition
There was no enforcement mechanism. The demand for
enforcement was seen as new and was considered unne-
cessary by some participants. Other participants said
that an independent enforcement body is necessary dur-
ing a treatment policy change.
I am not sure if there was a watchdog. I think it is
really very important because sometimes people say the
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drug companies are pushing for policy change.–Pharma-
cologist from MUHAS
Enforcement condition: evaluation
Despite growing concerns about the influence of phar-
maceutical companies on change of treatment policies,
we did not find any enforcement mechanism to ensure
the other three conditions were met.
Discussion
This study evaluated the process of changing the Tanza-
nia National Malaria Treatment Policy against the AFR
framework. The process resembled other priority-setting
decisions, in that it involved making choices among
competing alternatives in the context of limited
resources, conflicting evidence, diverse stakeholder
involvement, and the vagaries of political cycles [27].
The influence of power was evident insofar as some
individuals, groups, and institutions were better posi-
tioned than others to influence decision outcomes.
Power differences were associated with professional and
institutional status, the reliability of research findings,
ownership of financial resources, and the historical
dominance of the public healthcare delivery system.
When evaluated against the AFR, this study found that
the publicity condition was not fully satisfied. The study
found that the decision to prioritiseALu was made pub-
lic, but not the reasons behind it. Publicity requires that
the decision and its rationales, such as the ones for cov-
erage of new drugs like ALu, be publicly accessible to
all stakeholders, including the patients [17]. Similar find-
ings have been reported at the district level, where again
the decision but not the reasons behind it were commu-
nicated to stakeholders [21].
The study found that the rationale but not the stake-
holder involvement part of the relevance condition was
satisfied. ALu was the only artemisinin-based antimalar-
ial drug that was in a fixed-combination formulation. It
was also the most efficacious drug and neither of its two
components had any documented reports of parasite
resistance [6]. Cost-effectiveness evidence was not used
to inform the decision, but studies have shown that ALu
was the most cost-effective drug among the available
alternatives [28,29]. The selection of ALu was influenced
by an agreement between the WHO and Novartis, the
company that manufactures ALu, to monitor the global
demand and supply of the drug. In exchange, this agree-
ment enabled malaria-endemic developing countries to
procure the drug at cost price for distribution in the
public healthcare facilities [2]. However, the major con-
cern among the stakeholders is the sustainability of the
existing financing arrangement. Affordable Medicines
Facility-Malaria (AMFm) is currently pioneering a pilot
study to involve the private for-profit facilities [30]
because it has been shown that the private sector plays
a major role in malaria case management [31,32]. These
attempts to increase access to artemisinin-based antima-
larials must ensure that the delivery, financial, and gov-
ernance arrangements are compatible with the national
context needs [33]. Although artemisinin-based antima-
larial drugs are the best hope for malaria case manage-
ment, there are various challenges facing their use. In
areas where ALu has been deployed, patients frequently
do not adhere to its six-dose regimen, hence compro-
mising its effectiveness [34]. Studies have also shown
that many doses of these expensive drugs are lost due to
symptomatic diagnosis and inadequate slide reading
[35-37].
The study found that stakeholders were not ade-
quately involved and represented. Appropriately con-
ducted stakeholder participation not only facilitates and
widens discussions in the decision-making process but
also enhances publicity [17]. The task force committee
was also not representative. Proper representation of
healthcare professionals who also represent different
institutions at the discussion table was necessary. This
would have complemented the findings of the IMPACT
Project, which was carried out in order to inform the
policy change decision [38], which ultimately would
have enhanced accountability for reasonableness.
Even though we argue in favour of wide professional
and institutional representation, this should not aim to
replace patients and the general public. There is evi-
dence that health professionals’ views can differ consid-
erably from those of their patients [39]. However, the
involvement of the public and patients in an area popu-
lated by professionals is a challenge, especially in devel-
oping countries. It has been shown that potential
stakeholders at the district level in Tanzania have no
knowledge, skills, and experience to be able to partici-
pate effectively in priority-setting decisions [20]. Use of
large-scale surveys and the rapid appraisal method have
been tested and have proved successful in developing
countries. The views of key groups of people, like tea-
chers, shop owners, and students, elicited through inter-
views can adequately represent the opinions of their
communities [40].
The appeals and revision condition was not satisfied.
To our knowledge, there are no formal appeals mechan-
isms in the Tanzanian healthcare system for policy deci-
sions relating to access to new drugs or healthcare.
Pharmacovigilance systems in developing countries are
weak, and hence cannot be considered an efficient
appeal mechanism to inform policy makers of a drug
causing harm to its users. The lack of reliable appeal
mechanisms suggest that good arguments and evidences
against the original decision and which aim at improv-
ing faulty policy decisions can have no clear way back
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onto the decision table. A study by Maluka et al.
reported a lack of clear formal channels for appeals at
the district level in Tanzania [21].
The enforcement condition was not satisfied. This
condition recognises that public or private regulation
may be necessary if self-regulation proves unsuccessful
or inadequate. There are growing concerns about the
influence of pharmaceutical companies, which lobby and
push for national treatment policy changes, especially in
developing countries [14,16]. Hence, the establishment
of an independent regulatory body to guarantee fair pro-
cess during policy change is necessary. Other studies in
Tanzania have also reported lack of enforcement
mechanisms for priority-setting decisions due to poor
organisation, unclear lines of authority, low level of pub-
lic awareness, and inadequate public enforcement
mechanisms [21,22].
Strengths and limitations of the study
The qualitative research method is the best approach to
study complex phenomena when a researcher wants to
capture the views of individual persons, including their
feelings, understandings, interpretations, beliefs, and
ideologies. Through the use of this method, the partici-
pants shared their stories and conflicting views beyond
what the researchers expected to hear or what is avail-
able in the literature.
The study used the AFR as an evaluation framework;
however, there are objections to its use as an approach
to achieve justice and fairness [41,42]. Moreover, dif-
ferences may exist between the AFR’s definition and
participants’ views on the concept of fairness and its
evaluation. The results obtained from the interviewed
participants may not be the general views of the whole
group, as we interviewed only a part of the task force
team who may not be the true representation of the
group. As emerged from the interviews, some decisions
were made before the assembly of the task force com-
mittee, while other decisions were not made by the
task force committee per se. Due to resource and time
constraints, we did not interview any individuals from
the consultation group, the general population, or
patients’ representatives. Other stakeholders include
healthcare professionals outside the task force commit-
tee, the ALu manufacturing company, and Global
Fund as the financing institution. We strongly believe
that this study is missing the views of other individuals
who may possess important and reliable information
related to this study.
Conclusions
This study applied the AFR framework to evaluate the
priority-setting decision for new antimalarial drugs at
the national level. The study found that the priority-
setting decision in favour of ALu failed to satisfy the
four conditions of fair process prescribed in the ethical
framework of accountability for reasonableness. The
findings of this study are consistent with the reports of
other studies that evaluated priority-setting decisions
against AFR at the district level. The study emphasises
the need to involve a wide range of stakeholders in
priority-setting decisions. It further highlights the need
to make priority-setting decisions and their rationales
public and to establish mechanisms for appeal, revision,
and regulation in order to enhance fairness and legiti-
macy of the decision outcomes.
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